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Related Content. All those interested in Copernicus, transformation of images, application of metaphors, history of science,. Bakker and Claus Zittel. How were the relations among image, imagination and cognition characterized in the period — ? The authors of this volume argue that in those three centuries, a thoroughgoing transformation affected the following issues: i what it meant to understand phenomena in the natural world cognition ; ii how such phenomena were visualized or pictured images, including novel types of diagrams, structural models, maps, etc.

Early Modern Transformations of a Scientist and his Science

The essays collected in this volume examine the new conceptions that were advanced and the novel ways of comprehending and expressing the relations among image, imagination, and cognition. They also shed light, from a variety of perspectives, on the elusive nexus of conceptions and practices. Historical research in previous decades has done a great deal to explore the social and political context of early modern natural and moral inquiries. The present volume suggests that with an awareness of this context, it is now worth turning back to questions of the epistemic content itself.

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The contributors to the present collection were invited to explore how certain non-epistemic values had been turned into epistemic ones, how they had an effect on epistemic content, and eventually how they became ideologies of knowledge playing various roles in inquiry and application throughout early modern Europe. Terms and Conditions Privacy Statement. Powered by: PubFactory. Sign in to annotate.

Delete Cancel Save. Our late inquir[i]es have been very much employed about our understanding, and the several methods of obtaining truth. We generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any truth is nothing else than its moment, or efficacy to make men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting pleasure; and wisdom denotes only a capacity of pursuing this end by the best means. It must surely then be of the greatest importance, to have distinct conceptions of this end itself, as well as of the means necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greatest and most lasting pleasures, and not employ our reason, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in trifling pursuits.

It is to be feared indeed, that most of our studies, without this inquiry will be of very little use to us; for they seem to have scarce any other tendency than to lead us into speculative knowledge itself. Nor are we distinctly told how it is that knowledge, or truth, is pleasant to us. This consideration put the of the following papers upon inquiring into the various pleasures which human nature is capable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophic writings, nothing farther on this head, than some bare division of them into sensible, and rational, and some trite commonplace arguments to prove the latter more valuable than the former.

Our sensible pleasures are slightly passed over, and explained only by some instances in tastes, smells, sounds, or such like, which men of any tolerable reflection generally look upon as very trifling satisfactions. Our rational pleasures have had much the same kind of treatment.

Francis Hutcheson ()

We are seldom taught any other notion of rational pleasure than that which we have upon reflecting on our possession, or claim to those objects, which may be occasions of pleasure. Such objects we call advantageous; but advantage, or interest, cannot be distinctly concerned, till we know what those pleasures are which advantageous objects are apt to excite; and what senses or powers of perception we have with respect to such objects.

We may perhaps find such an inquiry of more importance in morals, to prove what we call the reality of virtue, or that it is the surest happiness of the agent, than one would at first imagine. In reflecting upon our external senses, we plainly see, that our perceptions of pleasure, or pain, do not depend directly on our will.

Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should.

The presence of some objects necessarily pleases us, and the presence of others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we by our will, any otherwise procure pleasure, or avoid pain, than by procuring the former kind of objects, and avoiding the latter. By the very frame of our nature the one is made the occasion of delight, and the other of dissatisfaction. The same observation will hold in all our other pleasures and pains.

In the later editions of this volume, what alterations are made, are partly owing to the objections of some gentlemen, who wrote very keenly against several principles in this book. The was convinced of some inaccurate expressions, which are now altered; and some arguments, he hopes, are now made clearer: but he has not yet seen cause to renounce any of the principles maintained in it. Nor is there any thing of consequence added, except in Sect.

In this there are additions interspersed, to prevent objections which have been against this scheme by several editionss; and some mathematical expressions are left out, which, upon second thoughts, appeared useless, and were disagreeable to some readers.

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Their moral philosophy contained these parts, ethicks taken more strictly, teaching the nature of virtue and regulating the internal dispositions; and the knowledge of the law of nature. This latter contained: 1. Oeconomicks, or the laws and rights of the several members of a family; and 3. Politicks, shewing the various plans of civil government, and the rights of fates with respect to each other. The following books contain the elements of these several branches of moral philosophy; which if they are carefully studied may give the youth an easier access to the well known and admired works either of the ancients, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Cicero; or of the moderns, Grotius, Cumberland, Puffendorf, Harrington and others, upon this branch of philosophy.

We imagine our fellows capable of the same, and can in like manner conceive public happiness.

4 Hume’s Copernican Turn

They are happy who have what they desire, and are free from what occasions pain. He is in a sure state of happiness, who has a sure prospect that in all parts of his existence he shall have all things which he desires, or at least those which he most earnestly desires, without any considerable pains. He is miserable who is under grievous pain, or who wants what he most violently desires. These desires, though they do not presuppose any sense of pain previous to the opinion, yet may be attended with pain, when the object imagined to be good is uncertain.

The former sort of desires are called appetites; the latter affections or passions. The pains of the appetites when they are not gratified are unavoidable. But the pains of many disappointed passions might have been prevented, by correcting the false opinions, or by breaking foolish associations of ideas, by which we imagine the most momentous good or evil to be in these objects or events, which really are of little or no consequence in themselves.

Men must first be free from violent bodily pain, and have what will remove hunger and thirst, before they can be made happy.

Thus much is absolutely necessary. If there be but small pleasure attending the enjoyment of the bare necessaries of life, yet there is violent pain in their absence. Whatever farther pleasures men enjoy, we may count so much positive happiness above necessity. References R. Foster , Modern Ireland , p. Down, ed. Chair of Moral Phil. Seamus Deane , gen. Answers [ online ] - itself based on the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Belfast sojourn? Lorem ipsum : The book which Hutcheson holds in his left hand in the portrait by Allan Ramsay made in [ supra ] is Cicero's De finibus bonorum et malorum On the Ends of Good and Evil.

The identity of the sources was established by Richard McClintock, the scholarly director of publications at the Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia USA, who located the phrase lorem ipsum that falls in that sentence at the top of p. The Lorem Ipsum was popularised as a Letraset transfer sheet and has also appeared on furniture materials such as curtains and upholstery.

Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendi: With a Short Introduction to Moral Phi

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