Our expectations are not quite as salient as are our primary memories, but they are there. All it takes is a rupture of some sort—the door may be locked, causing us to hit our head; the bus may not be our bus, or the driver may not see us and may continue driving—to realize that the structure of expectation was present in our consciousness. Time, Husserl argues, is not experienced as a series of discrete, independent moments that arise and instantly die; rather, experience of the present is always thick with past and future.
If the present is always constituted as a relation of past to future, then the very nature of time is itself relational , that is to say, it cannot be conceived as points on a line or as seconds on a clock. Deleuze employs the retentional-protentional structure of time, while discarding the notion of the primal impression. In a sense it is difficult to talk in a synthetic way about what Deleuze and Derrida find wrong with traditional metaphysics, because they each, in the context of their own specific projects, find distinct problems with the history of metaphysics.
For Deleuze, this will come down to a necessary and fundamental imprecision that accompanies traditional metaphysics. Inasmuch as the task of metaphysics is to think the nature of the thing , and inasmuch as it sets for itself essentialist parameters for doing so, it necessarily filters its own understanding of the thing through conceptual representations, philosophy can never arrive at an adequate concept of the individual.
Let us use a simple example, an inflated ball—we can describe it by as many representational concepts as we like: it is a certain color or a certain pattern, made of a certain material rubber or plastic, perhaps , a certain size , it has a certain degree of elasticity, is filled with a certain amount of air, and so forth. However many categories or concepts we may apply to this ball, the nature of this ball itself will always elude us.
Our conceptual characterization will always reach a terminus; our concepts can only go so far down. The ball is these characterizations, but it is also different from its characterizations as well. For Deleuze, if our ontology cannot reach down to the thing itself, if it is structurally and essentially incapable of comprehending the constitution of the thing, as any substance metaphysics will be , then it is, for the most part, worthless as an ontology.
Derrida casts his critiques of the history of metaphysics in the Heideggerian language of presence. Metaphysics consists of first establishing the binary, but from the moment it is established, it is already clear which of the two terms will be considered the good term and which the pejorative term—the good term is the one that is conceptually analogous to presence in either its spatial or temporal sense. A few examples will help elucidate this point: for Parmenides, divine wisdom entails an attempt to think that which is, at every present moment, the same.
Heraclitean flux is the way of the masses. In Plato the body, given that it is in constant flux , is the prison of the soul, and in the Phaedo , life is declared a disease, for which death is the cure. So we would be happiest if we could contemplate all the time; however, we unfortunately cannot as we also have bodies and so, various familial, social, and political responsibilities.
In Christianity, the flesh is subject to change which is the very essence of corruptibility while the Spirit is incorruptible or ever-present ; for Descartes, and for the early phenomenological tradition , only what is spatially present that is, immediate to consciousness , is indubitable. And for Descartes, the body insofar as it is at least possible to doubt its existence , is not most essentially me ; rather, my soul is what I am. The spatial and temporal senses of the emphasis on presence are completely solidified in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, whose phenomenological reduction attempts to focus its attention exclusively on the phenomena of consciousness, because only then can it accord with the philosophical demand for apodicticity; and he understands this experience as constituted on the model of the living present.
In each of these cases, a presence is valorized, and its correlative absence is suppressed. As was the case with Deleuze, however, Derrida will argue that the self-proclaimed task of metaphysics ultimately fails. Thus, and against some of his more dismissive critics , Derrida operates in the name of truth— when the history of metaphysics posits that presence is primary, and absence secondary , this claim, Derrida shows, is false.
Metaphysics, in all of its manifestations, attempts to cast out the impure , but somehow, the impure always returns , in the form of a supplementary term; the secondary term is always ultimately required in order to supplement the primary term. In other words, the absence that philosophy sought to cast out was present and infecting the present term from the origin.
In its effort to isolate ideal essences, constituted within the sphere of consciousness, phenomenology brackets or suspends all questions having to do with the real existence of the external world, the belief in which Husserl refers to as the natural attitude. The natural attitude is the non-thematic subjective attitude that takes for granted the real existence of the real world, absent and apart from my or any experience of it. Science or philosophy , in the mode of the natural attitude, ontologically distinguishes being from our perceptions of being, from which point it becomes impossible to ever again bridge the gap between the two.
Try as it might, philosophy in the natural attitude can only ever have representations of being, and certainty the telos of philosophical activity becomes untenable. It is for this reason that Husserl represents for Derrida the most strident defense of the metaphysics of presence, and it is for this reason that his philosophy also serves as the ground out of which the notion of constitutive difference is discovered. The sign , we should note, is typically understood as a stand-in for something that is currently absent.
Linguistically a sign is a means by which a speaker conveys to a listener the meaning that currently resides within the inner experience of the speaker. It is precisely this aim that Derrida takes apart. He claims signs are always pointing to something, but what they point to can assume different forms. An indication signifies without pointing to a sense or a meaning. The flu or bodily infection, for instance, is not the meaning of the fever, but it is brought to our attention by way of the fever—the fever, that is, points to an ailment in the body.
An expression, however, is a sign that is, itself, charged with conceptual meaning; it is a linguistic sign. There are countless types of signs—animal tracks in the snow point to the recent presence of life, a certain aroma in the house may indicate that a certain food or even a certain ethnicity of food, is being prepared—but expressions are signs that are themselves meaningful. An indication may very well be an expression, and expressions are almost always indications.
These signs are both indications and expressions. Furthermore, every time we use an expression of some sort, we are indicating something, namely, we are pointing toward an ideal meaning, empirical states of affairs, and so forth. In effect, one would be hard pressed to find a single example of a use of an expression that was not, in some sense, indicative. Husserl, however, will argue that even if, in fact , expressions are always caught up in an indicative function , that this has nothing to do with the essential distinction, obtaining de jure if not de facto between indications and expressions.
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Husserl cannot relinquish this conviction because, after all, he is attempting to isolate a pure moment of self-presence of meaning. So if expressions are signs charged with meaning , then Husserl will be compelled to locate a pure form of expression , which will require the absolute separation of the expression from its indicative function.
Indeed he thinks that this is possible. The reason expressions are almost always indicative is that we use them to communicate with others, and in the going-forth of the sign into the world, some measure of the meaning is always lost—no matter how many signs we use to articulate our experience, the experience can never be perfectly and wholly recreated within the mind of the listener. So to isolate the expressive essence of the expression, we must suspend the going-forth of the sign into the world. This is accomplished in the soliloquy of the inner life of consciousness. The signs themselves have only ideal , not real, existence.
Likewise, the signs employed in the interior monologue are not indicative in the way that signs in everyday communication are. Communicative expressions point us to states of affairs or the internal experiences of another person; in short, they point us to empirical events. Expressions of the interior monologue, however, do not point us to empirical realities, but rather, Husserl claims that in the interior expression, the sign points away from itself, and toward its ideal sense.
For Husserl, therefore, the purest, most meaningful mode of expression is one in which nothing is, strictly speaking, expressed to anyone. Here is a mundane example, one which has happened to each of us at some point in time: we walk into a room, and forget why we have entered the room. Is it not the case that the individual is communicating something to herself in this monologue? Husserl responds in the negative. The signs we are using are not making known to the self a content that was previously inaccessible to the self, which is what takes place in communication.
In pointing away from itself and directly toward the sense, the sense is not conveyed from a self to a self, but rather, the sense of the expression is experienced by the subject at exactly that same moment in time. Nevertheless, this does not keep Husserl from referring to the primal impression in terms of a point ; it is, he says, the source-point on the basis of which retention is established. While the primal impression is always, as we saw with Husserl, surrounded by a halo of retention and protention, nevertheless this halo is always thought from the absolute center of the primal impression , as the source-point of experience.
Voice and Phenomenon , This, we note, is the Husserlian manifestation of the emphasis on the temporal sense of presence in the philosophical tradition. Here, we should also note: Derrida never attempts to argue that philosophy should move away from the emphasis on presence. The philosophical tradition is defined by, Derrida claims, its emphasis on the present; the present provides the very foundation of certainty throughout the history of philosophy; it is certainty, in a sense. The present comprises an ineliminable essential element of the whole endeavor of philosophy.
Indeed, Derrida motions in this direction, which is one of the reasons that Derrida is more comfortable than many traditional academic philosophers writing in the style of and in communication with literary figures. The emphasis on presence within philosophy, strictly speaking is incontestable. Husserl, we saw, formulated his notion of the living present on the basis of his insistence on a qualitative distinction between retention as a mode of memory still connected to the present moment of consciousness, and representational memory, that deliberately calls to mind a moment of the past that has, since its occurrence, left consciousness.
This means, for Husserl, that retention must be understood in the mode of Presentation , as opposed to Representation. Retention is a direct intuition of what has just passed, directly presented, and fully seen, in the moment of the now, as opposed to represented memory, which is not. Retention is not, strictly speaking, the present; the primal impression is the present. Nevertheless, retention is still attached to the moment of the now. Furthermore, there is a sense in which retention is necessary to give us the experience of the present as such.
Moreover, given that retention is still essentially connected to the primal impression, which is itself always in the mode of passing away there is not a radical distinction between retention and primal impression; rather, they are continuous, and the primal impression is really only, Husserl claims, an ideal limit. There is thus a continual accommodation of Husserlian presence to non-presence, which entails the admission of a form of otherness into the self-present now-point of experience.
This accommodation is what keeps fundamentally distinct memory as retention and memory as representation. Nevertheless, the common root, making possible both retention and representational memory, is the structural possibility of repetition itself , which Derrida calls the trace. The trace is the mark of otherness, or the necessary relation of interiority to exteriority. Thus, in the very moment, the selfsame point of time , when the primal impression is impressed within experience, what is essentially necessary to the structure, in other words, not an accidental feature thereof , is the repeatability of the primal impression within retention.
To be experienced in a primal impression therefore requires that the object of experience be repeatable , such that it can mark itself within the mode of retention, and ultimately, representational memory. Thus the primal impression is traced with exteriority, or non-presence , before it is ever empirically stamped. In all of these directions, the presence of the present is thought beginning from the fold of the return, beginning from the movement of repetition and not the reverse. The self-presence of subjectivity, in which certainty is established, is inseparable from an experience of time, and the structural essentialities of the experience of time are marked by the trace.
It is more originary than the primordiality of phenomenological experience, because it is what makes it possible in the first place. Let us take this bit by bit.
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That it is constitutive does not, however, mean that it is originary , at least not without qualification. To speak of origins , for Derrida, implies an engagement with a presumed moment of innocence or purity, in other words, a moment of presence , from which our efforts at meaning have somehow fallen away. Derrida is therefore a differential ontologist in that, through his critiques of the metaphysical tradition, he attempts to think the fundamental explicitly on the basis of a differential structure , reading the canonical texts of the philosophical tradition both with and against the intentions of their authors.
An ontology of pure difference means an attempt to think difference as pure relation, rather than as a not -. The reason for this urgency, as we saw above, is that the task of philosophy is to have a direct relation to things, and in order for this to happen, philosophy needs to grasp the thing itself, and this means, the thing as it differs from everything else that it is not, the thing as it essentially is.
Reason, he claims, must reach down to the level of the individual. In other words, philosophy must attempt to think what he calls internal difference , or difference internal to Being itself. Above we noted that however many representational concepts we may adduce in order to characterize a thing, our example above was a ball , so long as we are using concepts rooted in identity to grasp it, we will still be unable to think down to the level of what makes this, this.
Therefore, philosophy suffers from an essential imprecision, which only differential ontology can repair. Unlike every other science, which all study some genus or species of being , the object of the metaphysical science, being qua being , is not a genus. This is because any given genus is differentiated by way of differences into species. Any species, beneath its given genus, is fully a member of that genus, but the difference that has so distinguished it, is not.
Let us take an example: the genus animal. In this case, the difference , we might say, is rational, by which the genus animal is speciated into the species of man and beast , for Aristotle. Both man and beast are equally members of the genus animal , but rational , the differentia whereby they are separated, is not. Differentiae cannot belong, properly, to the given genus of which they are differentiae, and yet, differences exist, that is, they have being.
Therefore, if differences have being , and the differentiae of any given genus cannot belong, properly speaking, to that genus, it follows that being cannot be a genus. The primary and common way in which a thing is said to be , Aristotle argues, is that it is a substance, a bearer of properties. Properties are , no doubt, but they are only to the extent that there is a substance there to bear them.
Metaphysics, therefore, is the science that studies primarily the nature of what it means to be a substance, and what it means to be an attribute of a substance, but insofar as it relates to a substance. All of these other qualities, and along with them, the Aristotelian categories, are related analogically , through substances, to being. Metaphysics , IV. Being is hierarchical in that there are greater and lesser degrees to which a thing may be said to be.
Analogical being easily and naturally allows the Scholastic tradition to hierarchize the scala naturae , the great chain of being, thus creating a space in language and in thought for the ineffable. Thus, ontology, understood analogically, cannot do what it is designed to do: to think being. To think a genuine concept of difference and hence, being requires an ontology which abandons the analogical model of being and affirms the univocity of being , that being is said in only one sense of everything of which it is said.
Here, Deleuze cites three key figures that have made such a transformation in thinking possible: John Duns Scotus, Benedict de Spinoza, and Friedrich Nietzsche. While, as noted, understanding being analogically affords the theological tradition a handy way of keeping the creation distinct from its creator, this same distance , Scotus thinks, also keeps us from truly possessing natural knowledge about God. So in order to save that knowledge, Scotus had to abolish the analogical understanding of being.
However, Deleuze notes, in order to keep from falling into a heresy of another sort namely, pantheism, the conviction that everything is God , Scotus had to neutralize univocal being. Being is therefore, univocal, but neutral and abstract, not affirmed. Spinoza offers the next step in the affirmation of univocal being. Spinoza creates an elaborate ontology of expression and immanent causality, consisting of substance, attributes, and modes. There is but one substance, God or Nature, which is eternal, self-caused, necessary, and absolutely infinite.
A given attribute is conceived through itself and is understood as constituting the essence of a substance, while a mode is an affection of a substance, a way a substance is. God is absolutely free because there is nothing outside of Nature which could determine God to act in such and such a way, so God expresses himself in his creation from the necessity of his own Nature. Thus Spinoza takes the step that Scotus could not; nevertheless, Spinoza does not quite complete the transformation to the univocity of being.
Spinoza leaves intact the priority of the substance over its modes. Modes can be thought only through substance , but the converse is not true. Thus for the great step Spinoza takes towards the immanentizing of philosophy, he leaves a tiny bit of transcendence untouched. The eternal return , or the constant returning of the same as the different, constitutes systems , but these systems are, as we saw above, nomadic and fluid, constituted on the basis of disjunctive syntheses , which is itself a differential communication between two or more divergent series.
Given in experience, Deleuze claims, is diversity—not difference as such , but differences , different things, limits, oppositions, and so forth. Insofar as they are the conditions of space and time as we sense them, this depth that he is looking for is itself an imperceptible spatio-temporality.
It is necessary, Deleuze claims, because the developmental and differential processes whereby living systems are constituted take place so rapidly and violently that they would tear apart a fully-formed being.
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At the embryonic level are series, with each series being defined by the differences between its terms, rather than its terms themselves. An intensity is essentially an energy , but an energy is always a difference or an imbalance, folded in on itself, an essentially elemental asymmetry.
These intensities are the terms of a given series. The terms, however, are themselves related to other terms, and through these relations, these intensities are continuously modified. An intensity is an embryonic quantity in that its own internal resonance, which is constitutive of higher levels of synthesis and actualization, pulsates in a pure speed and time that would devastate a constituted being; it is for this reason that qualities and surface phenomena can only come to be on a plane in which difference as such is cancelled or aborted.
In explicating its implicated differences, the system, so constituted, cancels out those differences, even if the differential ground rumbles beneath. A system is formed whenever two or more of these heterogeneous series communicate. Insofar as each series is itself constituted by differences, the communication that takes place between the two heterogeneous series is a difference relating differences, a second-order difference, which Deleuze calls the differenciator , in that these differences relate, and in so relating, they differenciate first-order differences.
This relation takes place through what Deleuze calls the dark precursor , comparing it to the negative path cleared for a bolt of lightning. Thus, Deleuze claims, the compounding or synthesis of these systems, series, and relations are the introduction of spatio-temporal dynamisms, which are themselves the sources of qualities and extensions. Difference in itself teems with vitality and life. As systems differentiate, their differences ramify throughout the system, and in so doing, series form new series, and new systems, de-enlisting and redistributing the singular points of interest and their constitutive and corresponding nomadic relations, which are themselves implicating , and, conversely , explicated in the phenomenal realm.
The disjunctive synthesis is the affirmative employment of the creativity brought about by the various plays of differences. Leibniz defined the perfection of the cosmos in terms of its compossibility, and this in terms of a maximization of continuity. The disjunctive synthesis brings about the communication and cooperative disharmony of divergent and heterogeneous series; it does not, thereby, cancel the differences between them.
Where incompossibility for Leibniz was a means of exclusion—an infinity of possible worlds excluded from reality on the basis of their incompossibility, in the hands of Deleuze, it becomes a means of opening the thing to the possible infinity of events. Finally, the eternal return is the name that Deleuze gives to the pulsating-contracting temporality according to which the pure spatium or depth differenciates. In Chapter 2 of Difference and Repetition , Deleuze employs the Husserlian discussion of the living present. Deleuze will argue that, with respect to time, the present is all there is , but the present itself is nothing more than the relation of retention to protention.
The present can only pass , Deleuze claims, because the past is already in the present , reaching through the present , into the future , drawing the future into itself. Time, in other words, is nothing more than the contraction of past and future. The present, therefore, is the beating heart of difference in itself , but it is a present constituted on the basis of a differentiation. Deleuze is therefore a differential ontologist in that he attempts to formulate a notion of difference that is: 1 The constitutive play of forces underlying the constitution of identities; 2 Purely relational, that is, non-negational, and hence, not in any way subordinate to the principle of identity.
It is an ontology that attempts to think the conditions of identity but in such a way as to not recreate the presuppositions surrounding identity at the level of the conditions themselves—it is an ontology that attempts to think the conditions of real experience , the world as it is lived. To briefly sum up, we can say that Derrida and Deleuze are the two key differential ontologists in the history of philosophy. While others before them were indeed thinkers of multiplicity, as opposed to thinkers of identity, none, so rigorously as Derrida and Deleuze, came to the conclusion that what was required in order to truly think multiplicity was an explicit formulation of a concept of difference, in itself.
One of the key distinctions between the two of them, which explains many of their other differences, is their respective attitudes towards fidelity to the tradition of philosophy. While Derrida will understand fidelity to the tradition in the sense of embracing the presuppositions and prejudices of the tradition, using them, ultimately, to think beyond the tradition, but in such a way as to speak constantly of the end of metaphysics , and ultimately eschewing the adoption of any traditional philosophical terms such as ontology, being , and so forth; Deleuze, on the contrary, will understand fidelity to the philosophical tradition in the sense of embracing what philosophy has always sought to do, to think the fundamental , and will, in the name of this task, happily discard any presuppositions or prejudices that the tradition has attempted to bestow.
So, while Derrida will, for instance, claim that the founding privilege of presence is not up for grabs in philosophy, but will, at the same time, avoid using terms like experience , being , ontology , concept , and so forth, Deleuze will claim that it is precisely the emphasis on presence in the form of representational concepts and categories that has kept philosophy from living up to its task.
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Therefore, the prejudice should be discarded. But that does not mean, Deleuze will argue, that we should give up metaphysics. If the old metaphysics no longer works, throw it out, and build a new one, from the ground up, if need be, but a new metaphysics, all the same. The following is an annotated list of the key sources in which the differential ontologies of Derrida and Deleuze are formulated.
There are many terrific volumes of secondary material on these two thinkers, but here are selected a few of the most relevant with respect to the themes explored in this article. Vernon W. Cisney Email: vcisney gmail. Differential Ontology Differential ontology approaches the nature of identity by explicitly formulating a concept of difference as foundational and constitutive, rather than thinking of difference as merely an observable relation between entities, the identities of which are already established or known.
The Origins of the Philosophy of Difference in Ancient Greek Philosophy Although the concept of differential ontology is applied specifically to Derrida and Deleuze, the problem of difference is as old as philosophy itself. Parmenides Parmenides b. Plato It is these two accounts, the Heraclitean and the Parmenidean with an emphatic privileging of the latter , that Plato attempts to answer and fuse in his theory of forms. Key Themes of Differential Ontology As noted in the Introduction, differential ontology is a term that can be applied to two specific thinkers Deleuze and Derrida of the late twentieth century, along with those philosophers who have followed in the wakes of these two.
Immanence The word immanence is contrasted with the word transcendence. Time as Differential Related to the privileging of immanence is the second principle of central importance to differential ontology, a careful and rigorous analysis of time. Critique of Essentialist Metaphysics In a sense it is difficult to talk in a synthetic way about what Deleuze and Derrida find wrong with traditional metaphysics, because they each, in the context of their own specific projects, find distinct problems with the history of metaphysics.
Key Differential Ontologists a. Voice and Phenomenon , 53 This, we note, is the Husserlian manifestation of the emphasis on the temporal sense of presence in the philosophical tradition. Conclusion To briefly sum up, we can say that Derrida and Deleuze are the two key differential ontologists in the history of philosophy. References and Further Reading The following is an annotated list of the key sources in which the differential ontologies of Derrida and Deleuze are formulated.
Primary Sources Deleuze, Gilles. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, Deleuze, Gilles.
David Lapoujade, Trans. Michael Taormina. Los Angeles and New York: Semiotext e , Difference and Repetition. Translated by Paul Patton. This is without question the most important book Deleuze ever wrote. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Translated by Martin Joughin.
This book was his secondary, historical thesis in , though there is good evidence that the book was actually first drafted in , around the same time as the book on Nietzsche. The concept of expression, here analyzed in Spinoza, plays a very important role for Deleuze, and it is Spinoza who provides an alternative ontology of immanence which, contrary to that of Hegel, quite prominent in mids France , does not rely upon the movement of negation, a concept that, for Deleuze, does not belong in the domain of ontology.
This emphasis already plays a role in the Review of Hyppolite mentioned above. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, The Logic of Sense. Translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale.
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New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, This text is interesting for a number of reasons. In addition, the appendices in this volume include important essays on the reversal of Platonism, on the Stoics, and on Pierre Klossowski. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. Nevertheless, it is certainly high on the list of importance. Derrida, Jacques. Translated by Barbara Johnson. Margins of Philosophy. Translated by Alan Bass.
This book is a collection of essays from the lates up through the early s, and is another from the publication blitz. It is very important for numerous reasons, but in no small part because it is here that his engagement with the work of Martin Heidegger, which will occupy him throughout the remainder of his career , robustly begins. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. In addition, it is really one of the only book-length pieces Derrida wrote that is at least the first part , merely programmatic and expository, as opposed to the prolonged engagements he typically undertakes with a particular text or thinker the second part of the book is such an engagement, primarily with the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
This book is from the group, and is a very short collection of interviews. It is highly recommended as a good starting-point for those approaching Derrida for the first time. Here Derrida lays out in very straightforward, programmatic terms, the stakes of the deconstructive project, unencumbered by deep textual analysis. Voice and Phenomenon. Leonard Lawlor. This is probably the single most important book that Derrida wrote.
It is, like most of the rest of his work, a textual engagement with Husserl. Writing and Difference. Secondary Sources There are many terrific volumes of secondary material on these two thinkers, but here are selected a few of the most relevant with respect to the themes explored in this article. Bell, Jeffrey A. Philosophy at the Edge of Chaos. The Problem of Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism. Bogue, Ronald. Deleuze and Guattari. London and New York: Routledge, Bryant, Levi.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, De Beistigui, Miguel. Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, Descombes, Vincent. Modern French Philosophy. Scott-Fox and J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, It is still one of the best, especially given its brevity. Chapters 5 and 6 are particularly relevant. Cambridge and London: HarvardUniversity Press, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life.
Hughes, Joe. Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation. Lawlor, Leonard. It is without question one of the best books on Derrida available. Marrati, Paola. Stanford: Stanford University Press, Smith, Daniel W. Essays on Deleuze.
Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversity Press, Please send your abstract to: derridatodayconference gmail. Special Issue editor Michael Naas. Doi: DOI: Anderson, N. View on antennae. Derrida: Ethics Under Erasure, Continuum more. Derrida: Ethics Under Erasure contests a common interpretation that deconstruction is unethical and nihilistic. At the same time it argues that while Derrida does not At the same time it argues that while Derrida does not offer an ethical or political treatise, deconstruction challenges ethical systems without rejecting them.
It has also been necessary, for some time now, to move beyond dismissals and deifications of Derrida. Derrida: Ethics Under Erasure provides a nuanced reading of Derrida, while accepting the difficulty of any simple affirmation of the deconstructive tradition. State University, USA. This book should put to rest once and for all the uninformed and yet widespread belief that deconstruction is irresponsible, unethical, or nihilistic.
Derrida, Ethics, Under Erasure, philosophy, nihilism, morality. Cultural Theory in Everyday Practice Oxford UP more. Culture Under Contract, Routledge Press, forthcoming more. Culture, Biology, Bioculture. Auto Immunity: the deconstruction and politics of 'bio-art' and criticism more. Deconstruction , Politics , Bioart , and Derrida. But in taking this position, Colebrook points out that creative evolution re-establishes the humanistic discourse on the human that it was attempting to challenge. Defending Derrida more. It is Derrida Today Conference. Publication Name: 6th Derrida Today Conference.
The conference will