What followed was an idealised image of pre-capitalist reality, whereby people lived united by the bonds of blood, tradition and mutual faith and protection, from the earth and in nature, preserving their existential essence from the fragmentation which is imposed by the advanced division of labour and the continuous hunt for material gain in a society cut up into competitive individuals.
According to Aron in Penser La Guerre Clausewitz was one of the first writers condemning the militarism of military elites and their war-proneness based on the famous sentence "war is a continuation of politics by other means". Kondylis claimed that this was a reconstruction not coherent with Clausewitz's thought.
Clausewitz was, according to Kondylis, morally indifferent to war from a theoretical point of view, and his propounding of the value of political rule over war had nothing to do with pacifistic claims. For Clausewitz war was just a means in the eternal quest for power in an often anarchical and unsafe world, and as such war could neither be a continuous phenomenon, nor cease altogether. In other words, war arose from the political i. Kondylis saw in Clausewitz a general theory of war with sufficiently inclusive and elastic conceptualisation which could cover all forms of strategy — even antithetical forms: from primitive guerrilla warfare to extremely technicised contemporary war, as well as the possibility of terrorism using advanced technology to cripple modern-day societies.
Kondylis continued with an analysis of Lenin's, Engels's and Marx's theories of war, articles about military staff and politicians, technological and absolute war, and concluded in the Greek edition with an analysis of a possible Greek—Turkish war. The Liberal Modern and the mass-democratic Post-modern , Kondylis used Weberian ideal-typical analysis to outline the great "paradigm shift" of post-Modernity from around onwards, in bringing to an end the previously dominant bourgeois-liberal hierarchical and humanist world-view, and ushering in a new era of mass-democratic pluralism and leveling of hierarchies based on mass-democratic social formations characterised by, inter alia , historically unprecedented mass production and mass consumption, atomisation and mobility, and, not least of all, the various forms of mass-democratic ideology.
To this end, Kondylis made effective use of his distinction between the "synthetic-harmonising thought-form" and the "analytic-combinatory thought-form" in which the latter set aside the former during the same period as the setting-aside of classical bourgeois liberalism by mass democracy, which for the most part occurred as the re-interpretation and changing of liberalism in accordance with the needs of mass democracy, and not always as an open and programmatic clash between the two.
The "synthetic-harmonising thought-form" and the "analytic-combinatory thought-form" distinction is applied by Kondylis to his extensive overview of developments in the arts including literature, music, architecture, the visual arts, cinema , as well as of developments in philosophy, the sciences and commonplace mind-sets and ways of living, mainly from the second half of the 19th century until the cultural revolution of the s and s.
The end of the Cold War in particular emerges as a pivotal point in history in which the European Modern Era finds itself in its historical twilight while coming full circle, absorbed by the Planetary Era which the European Modern Era itself inaugurated with the great geographic discoveries of the 15th and 16th centuries. Planetary history gulps down its creator, European history — another one of the blaring examples of the unintended consequences of collective action in history. Kondylis's published works as a whole can be seen as a unified series of analyses based on an unwavering adherence to empirical fact and logical consistency no matter what aspect of study is being emphasised at any given time.
He sought to eliminate artificial academic boundaries between e. He thought of himself as "an observer of human affairs" or "writer" or "historian of ideas, social historian and theorist" always writing by hand , rather than as a "philosopher", producing a body of work that bears little resemblance to any other author, apart from perhaps Max Weber. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article needs additional citations for verification.
Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Panagiotis Kondylis's only published picture . Drouva near Olympia , Elis , Greece. Athens , Greece.
Content List: Karl Marx / Friedrich Engels Papers
Dieter Henrich , Max Weber. When asked for a photograph for a German academic yearbook, he chose to write a small note instead: "I cannot understand the relationship between a writer's appearance and the value of his theoretical work. Laska of 16 June , in Bernd A.
Interview with Rudolf Burger in: Wiener Zeitung, 1. Juni Stachowiak Hg. Iggers Boston: Beacon Press.
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Laubische Verlagsbuchhandlung. Ashton London: Routledge. Band 1 Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Band 2 Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Supplementary Volume 7: — Goshgarian London: Verso. Althusser Louis  On the Reproduction of Capitalism. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses translated by G. Apostle Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Becker August Was wollen die Kommunisten? Lausanne: S. Nassar Stanford: Stanford University Press. Vesey and Eric Bentley London: Methuen. Thompson Leiden: Brill. Second Series. Cohen G. By Allen W. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dahrendorf Ralf  Homo Sociologicus. Elbe Ingo Marx im Westen. Engel Ulrich  Deutsche Grammatik. Feuerbach Ludwig  Gesammelte Werke. Geraets Henry S. Harris and Wal A. Suchting Indianapolis: Hackett. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Goethe Johann Wolfgang von Werke. Neun und Vierzigster Band Stuttgard: J. Band 1. Erster Teil. Dritter Teil. Die Philosophie des Geistes. Wood translated by H.
Nisbet Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sibree Kitchener: Batoche. Miller revised by Michael J. Inwood Oxford: Clarendon Press. Michael Stewart translated by Peter C. Hodgson Oxford: Oxford University Press. He pointed out that the unpaid appropriation of the "forces collectives" collective power of the employed workers is one of the sources of the surplus value.
A second reason for Marx' furious attack on Proudhon was that Marx wanted to get at the top of the international labour movement and therefore he tried to establish his political program as the absolute one. As I pointed out elsewhere,  Marx used various means to destroy Proudhon as his political opponent. Marx arbitrarily arranges quotations of Proudhon's Philosophie de la Misere or separates them from their context to underline his own views. He even tempers with quotations.
Thus he can impute opinions to Proudhon which the French philosopher doesn't support but facilitates Marx to polemicize. Marx likes to construct artificial contradictions in Proudhon's text in order to bring his opponent into discredit in the labour movement. Marx tries everything to make fun of Proudhon and to ridicule him.
The different methods and scientific views of both opponents correspond with different political tactics and strategies Marx and Proudhon propose for reaching a classless society. Marx's historical-critical analysis is consistent with his propagating of the class struggle of the proletariat. Proudhon's descriptive method corresponds with his suggestion of an "Association progressive", the preparation of which his book Philosophie de la Misere was to serve. By selling their products at cost price these "Associations" will abolish profits and cause the capitalist enterprises to give up.
While Proudhon, like Gustav Landauer, calls for an opting out of capitalism here and now, Marx considers a revolution as successful only if the development of technique and industry has led to the development of the working class as a "class for itself". To come back to the question at the beginning. Why can the knowledge of the dispute between Proudhon and Marx be important today? Perhaps there are two answers:. The future of the left will depend on their willingness to set up a tolerant culture of discussion inside the left and within the society at large, that is, to avoid furious attacks like the polemic of Marx against Proudhon, and examine, instead, seriously the arguments of other groups, movements and individuals.
Only in such an atmosphere of debate, the approval of different methods and means, on the way to an alternative society, is possible. A problematique, which will be the basis for a new project aiming to provide not just another utopia justified by pseudo-scientific or "objective" laws of social evolution but also a way out of the chronic multidimensional crisis to which the dynamic of the market economy and representative democracy has led us.
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Today, almost a century and a half since this debate, the socialist project is in ruins after the collapse of both expressions of statist socialism the version of socialism which dominated the socialist movement since then i. This is obvious by the huge and presently exploding concentration of political and economic power at fewer and fewer hands. To my mind, the present failure of libertarian socialism is not accidental. I will attempt below to examine this debate in connection with their respective views on three major areas of difference or similarity:.
Beyond the Marxist and Proudhonian " sciences". Both Marx and Proudhon had no doubts about the "scientific" character of their own theories. This was not of course unexpected if one takes into account that, at the time they developed their own liberatory projects, "scientism", i. In such a climate, respectability about the seriousness of their views on an alternative society could only be gained by draping them in "scientific" colours.
Of course, this does not mean that the two protagonists did not genuinely believe that they have discovered the laws governing the economy and society. Thus, Marx, on the basis of changes in the "economic sphere" i. Marx had no doubts about the "scientific" character of his economic laws, which he viewed as "iron" laws yielding inevitable results, or about the "objective" character of his conception, which he paralleled to a natural history process:.
It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history Similarly, Proudhon, writing earlier than Marx, had no doubts at all about the "scientific" and "objective" character of his theories. In fact, the beginning sentence of the first chapter in his Philosophy of Misery is an affirmation of his belief in economic science:. This proposition, which few economists now dare to question … I affirm, on the other hand, the absolute certainty as well as the progressive nature of economic science, of all the sciences in my opinion the most comprehensive, the purest, the best supported by facts.
Say i. In such a situation what is the mandate of science? Certainly not to halt in an arbitrary, inconceivable, and impossible juste milieu; it is to generalize further, and discover a third principle, a fact, a superior law, which shall explain the fiction of capital and the myth of property, and reconcile them with the theory which makes labour the origin of all wealth.
This is what socialism, if it wishes to proceed logically, must undertake … it is enough to say that there is a superior formula which reconciles the socialistic utopias and the mutilated theories of political economy, and that the problem is to discover it.
Thus, as he points out in a letter to J. Schweitzer: . Science for him reduces itself to the slender proportions of a scientific formula; he is the man in search of formulas. Not surprisingly, recently, structural-Marxists declared that Marxism is not only a science but a superior science, in fact, "the" science of all sciences, given its ability to synthesise the various special sciences: "Marxism therefore becomes the general theory of Theoretical Practice and the key to and judge of what counts as genuine knowledge.
It is therefore obvious that both Proudhon and Marx, following the modernis t tradition, attempted to rely on objective theories and methods, i.
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The implicit argument in favour of such an approach is that such theories and methods reflect in fact "objective processes" at work in society or the natural world. It is problematic because few believe today, after the decisive introduction in twentieth-century science of the uncertainty principle and chaos theory, that it is still possible to derive any "objectivy" "laws" or "tendencies" of social change.
If cause and effect can be uncertain even in physics, the most exact of sciences, and the reference to necessary and universal laws is disputed even with respect to the natural world, it is obvious that postulating objective laws or tendencies which are applicable to society is, at least, absurd. It is undesirable because, as the case of the statist socialism has shown, there is a definite link between the "scientification" of that project in the hands of Marxists-Leninists and the consequent bureaucratisation of socialist politics and the totalitarian transformation of social organisation.
In other words, It was exactly the Marxist conversion of the socialist project into an "objective" science that contributed significantly to the establishment of new hierarchical structures, initially, in the socialist movement and, later, in society at large. Thus, it is a well-known historical fact that in both the pre-revolutionary Marxist movements, as well as in the post-revolutionary governments, the justification of the concentration of power in the hands of the party elite was based on the "fact" that they alone "knew" how to interpret history and take appropriate action in order to accelerate the historical process towards socialism.
It is not the intentions of Marx or Proudhon et al, as such, that might lead to such a development but the "scientification" or "objectification" of the liberatory project, from Marx to Proudhon and from Kropotkin to Bookchin which inevitably leads to the creation of a new hierarchical division within the liberatory movement between the holders of the "scientific" or "objective" truth and the rest. Thus, adopting the post-modern "generalised conformism",  in effect, implies the abandonment of any idea of a liberatory project under the miserable pretext of letting "polyphony" flourish and under the right banner that "politics, rightly understood, is firmly subjective ".
Today, it is possible to define a liberatory project for an inclusive democracy without recourse to controversial objective grounds, or to post-modern neo—conservatism. Thus, when we define the liberatory project in terms of the demand for social and individual autonomy, as I did elsewhere,  we do so because we responsibly choose autonomy, as well as its expression in democracy, and we explicitly rule out the possibility of establishing any "objective" laws, processes or tendencies which, inevitably, or "rationally", lead to the fulfilment of the autonomy project.
Thus, as an expression of collective autonomy, politics takes the form of calling into question the existing institutions and of changing them through deliberate collective action. Also, as an expression of individual autonomy, "the polis secures more than human survival. Democracy, as a process of social self-institution, implies a society which is open ideologically, namely, which is not grounded on any closed system of beliefs, dogmas or ideas.
The choice of autonomy implies that the institution of society is not based on any kind of irrationalism faith in God, mystical beliefs, etc. The fundamental element of autonomy is the creation of our own truth, something that social individuals can only achieve through direct democracy, that is, the process through which they continually question any institution, tradition or "truth". In a democracy, there are simply no given truths. The practice of individual and collective autonomy presupposes autonomy in thought.
But, if it is neither feasible, nor desirable to ground the demand for democracy on "scientific" or "objective" "laws" or "tendencies" which direct social evolution towards the fulfilment of objective potentialities, then, this demand can only be founded on a liberatory project. Such a liberatory project today can only constitute a synthesis of the democratic, the socialist, the libertarian and radical green and feminist traditions.
In other words, it can only be a project for an inclusive democracy, in the sense of political, economic, "social" and ecological democracy. Still, the fact that the project for autonomy in general and for an inclusive democracy in particular is not objectively grounded does not mean that "anything goes" and that it is therefore impossible to derive any definable body of principles to assess social and political changes, or to develop a set of ethical values to assess human behaviour.
Reason is still necessary in a process of deriving the principles and values which are consistent with the project of autonomy and, as such, are rational. Therefore, the principles and values derived within such a process do not just express personal tastes and desires; in fact, they are much more "objective" than the principles and values that are derived from disputable interpretations of natural and social evolution.
The logical consistency of the former with the project of autonomy could be assessed in an indisputable way, unlike the contestable "objectivity" of the latter. To conclude, "scientism", as well as irrationalism, do not have any role to play in the process that will move us towards an inclusive democracy. Furthermore, democracy is even less compatible with irrational systems claiming esoteric knowledge, whether from mystical experience, intuition, or revelation.
This implies that the project for democracy may be grounded only on our own conscious choice between the heteronomous and the autonomous tradition. Furthermore, it avoids relativism because it explicitly denies the view that all traditions, as in this case the autonomy and heteronomy ones, have equal truth values. In other words, taking for granted that autonomy and democracy cannot be "proved" but only postulated, we value autonomy and democracy more than heteronomy because, although both traditions are true, still, it is autonomy and democracy which we identify with freedom and we assess freedom as the highest human objective.
But, it is not only on methodology, and particularly the belief in "objective" or "scientific" truths regarding society, that Marx and Proudhon had a common attitude. The same applies as regards their respective economic theories, despite some obvious differences between them. Thus, the classical solution of expressing the value of goods and services in terms of man hours, which was developed by the orthodox political economists of the time, was adopted by both Proudhon and Marx. Furthermore, as I attempted to show elsewhere  it is incompatible with a system of allocation based on freedom of choice.
This is why I proposed a model of economic democracy  which unlike the Proudhonian model presupposes a stateless, moneyless and marketless economy, and which precludes the institutionalisation of privileges for some sections of society and the private accumulation of wealth, without having to rely on a mythical post-scarcity state of abundance.
Instead, both the value of commodities and labour are determined through the individual and collective choices of citizens. The fact however that Proudhon does not rule out the market system leads him to a celebration of competition, unlike Marx and most socialists and anarchists who had a clear idea of the negative significance of competition, both within the framework of a market economy and that of an alternative society. Thus as Proudhon stresses:. Monopoly is the natural opposite of competition.
Competition is the vital force which animates the collective being: to destroy it, if such a supposition were possible, would be to kill society. There are two ways in which one may interpret these Proudhonian statements on competition. Marx therefore had a much superior understanding of the economic significance of competition, although he himself fell victim of his "scientific" interpretation of history, as it is indicated by the fact that in his dialectical scheme he considered competition as "engendered by feudal monopoly" which represents the thesis, competition the antithesis and modern monopoly the synthesis.
But, as I tried to show elsewhere,  there is no convincing evidence to support the Marxist view that some sort of evolutionary process could explain the move from pre - "market economy" forms of economic organisation to the present internationalised market economy "internationalised market economy". In fact, the market economy itself did not actually "evolve" out of a feudal era but literally exploded, particularly in England, during the eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries. However, if we accept the hypothesis that competition is the motor of the market economy this means that the present concentration of economic power and the internationalisation of the market economy are not just the result of "bad" government policies, or "market failures".
As I tried to show elsewhere, the shift from proprietary or entrepreneurial capitalism to the present internationalised market economy, where a few giant corporations control the world economy, did not happen, as for instance Chomsky presents it, as the outcome of "a reaction to great market failures of the late nineteenth century.
The market failures are not a God-given calamity. Excepting the case of monopolies, almost all market failures in history have been directly or indirectly related to competition. It was competition, which created the need for expansion, so that the best from the point of view of profits technologies and methods of organising production economies of scale etc are used. It was the same competition, which had led to the present explosion of mergers and take-overs in the advanced capitalist countries, as well as the various "strategic alliances".
In this problematique, it is not possible, within the existing institutional framework of parliamentary democracy and the market economy, to check the process of increasing concentration of economic power. But, let us see first his conception of democracy compared to that of Marx.
Beyond the Marxian and Proudhonian conceptions of "democracy". It is not accidental that for Marxists, as well as for many libertarians including Proudhon, democracy, even if it is meant as direct democracy, is considered as a kind of "rule" which presupposes a division between state and society.
It is therefore obvious that both the Marxist conception of democracy, as well as that adopted by several libertarians including Proudhon, is incompatible with the classical conception of it. Thus, as regards first the Marxist conception of democracy, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, it is clearly a statist conception of democracy. In this conception, democracy is not differentiated from the state for the entire historical period which separates capitalism from communism, that is, for the entire period that is called the "realm of necessity", when scarcity leads to class antagonisms which make inevitable class dictatorships of one kind or another.
In this view, socialism will simply replace the dictatorship of one class, the bourgeoisie, by that of another, the proletariat. Thus, for Marx. Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into another.