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TULISAN POPULER

Scientific Use of Theoretical Postulates: Mental Imagery Mental imagery is another type of postulate in the form of a theoretical entity, which is utilized in cognitive science, psychology, robotics, computer science, philosophy etc. A theoretical entity is a symbol and aspect of a spatial and temporal or mathematical model, which corresponds to some particular data set attained from observations.

In certain sciences, such as microphysics the theoretical entity does match or closely resemble the actual entity itself. However, the image is crucial for understanding the physical meaning of the entity. Mental imagery is recognizable to each of us who is able to non-verbally imagine sights, sounds, tastes etc. You may consider the visualizations you have had during novels you read.

The middle temporal area of the visual cortex is involved with visual mental imagery of stimuli that move Goebel et al. What still has to be accounted for concerns the difference between brain activity and images since they are not both presented together as a single plan and at one position. What then arises are descriptions, which are correlations between the body, including the brain, and worldly phenomena i. There are many differences, of course, between seeing and visually imagining, which are also measurable with fMRI analyses and psychological techniques.

For instance, during visual perception the response time periods of neurons are significantly shorter than during visual imagery formation, which can differ anywhere from approximately 0. Another set of theoretical absurdities involves the insistence that the self, or selfhood, is a substance that persists through time and which views these mental pictures that are totally private. Many problems arise concerning the latter sorts of speculative hypotheses or theoretical analogies since, for example, other types of mental imagery from other sensory modalities e.

There are, of course, cases with technology that involve sensory substitution devices, such as glasses that have video input capabilities along with audio output, which allow for blind people to perceive visual images via musical sounds Levy-Tzedek et al. For instance, the mental representation is often conceived as including the vehicle which represents i. The mental representata perform some of the most complex cognitive processes of the brain that incorporate information that is relevant to enhancing survival chances efficiently Metzinger, , Of course, it is always virtuous to ground our theories or construct them from some practical application when possible.

Some of the most innovative research concerning mental imagery involves one imagining that she is moving her own arms and walking while she lies within a real-time fMRI machine. Control via purely mental events or thought control, however, does not occur. Cohen et al. The process, based on motor imagery, has allowed subjects located in Israel to control a HOAP3 humanoid robot in France, experiencing the whole experiment through the eyes of the robot.

Entelechy – The realisation of potential

PSM and PMIR are theoretical entities that are utilized for the decisive conceptual interconnection of the first- and third-person approaches to consciousness, mind, mental events etc. They are constituents of your PSM. All those properties of yourself, to which you can now direct your attention, form the content of your current PSM. Your self-directed thoughts operate on the current contents of your PSM: they cannot operate on anything else.

If you want to initiate a goal-directed action aimed at some aspect of yourself—for example, brushing your hair or shaving yourself—you need a conscious self-model to deliberately initiate these actions. Of course, there is unconscious behavior like scratching or automatic self- protective behavior—for instance, when a ball suddenly comes flying toward you at high speed.

We can also imagine a sleepwalker scratching himself or even avoiding a ball, or an epileptic patient with an absence automatism brushing his hair or shaving. All these are not self-directed actions, they are self-directed behaviors; a conscious process of goal selection does not precede them. According to Metzinger , , concerning conscious experience, the cognitive agency happens when processes of selecting contents of cognition for additional processing becomes represented, in which case it is integrated within the PSM.

Embodiment within remote controlled robots is allowing for these evolved processes to utilize this coordination for various alternative goals. Roles of Creativity and Mental Imagery: Dichotomies At this juncture perhaps it is most appropriate to suspend our conceptual investigation and considerations of the mental image as a scientifically observable phenomenon e.

Perhaps to the same degree we find mental imagery to be challenging to study as a result of its relation to abstract, personal, and first-person accounts, we are struck by the abstractness, cultural, social and third-person accounts of creativity. Creativity in the latter sense involves what is generally considered to be an outward expression or performance of something artful, inventive and innovative in some way, although neurocognitive processes are also assumed to be requisite for the imagination that determines these creative outbursts.

As he goes on improving and reconstructing, his force of concentration diminishes and he loses sight of the great underlying principle. Results may be obtained, but always at the sacrifice of quality. My method is different. I do not rush into actual work. When I get an idea, I start at once building it up in my imagination. I change the construction, make improvements and operate the device in my mind. It is absolutely immaterial to me whether I run my turbine in thought or test it in my shop. I even note if it is out of balance. There is no difference whatever; the results are the same.

In this way I am able to rapidly develop and perfect a conception without touching anything. When I have gone so far as to embody in the invention every possible improvement I can think of and see no fault anywhere, I put into concrete form this final product of my brain. Invariably my device works as I conceived that it should, and the experiment comes out exactly as I planned it. In twenty years there has not been a single exception.

Why should it be otherwise? There is scarcely a subject that cannot be examined beforehand, from the available theoretical and practical data. The carrying out into practice of a crude idea as is being generally done, is, I hold, nothing but a waste of energy, money, and time.

Within the latter quotation and within chapter II. Interestingly, some of the cognitive science literature on the topic of mental imagery concludes that there is a relatively minor relation between the vividness of mental imagery and creativity. By states of consciousness are meant such things as sensations, desires, emotions, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, volitions, and the like. Psychology is to be treated as a natural science. This requires a word of commentary. Most thinkers have a faith that at bottom there is but one Science of all things, and that until all is known, no one thing can be completely known.

Such a science, if realized, would be Philosophy. In order not to be unwieldy, every such science has to stick to its own arbitrarily-selected problems, and to ignore all others. Every science thus accepts certain data unquestioningly, leaving it to the other parts of Philosophy to scrutinize their significance and truth. All the natural sciences, for example, in spite of the fact that farther reflection leads to Idealism, assume that a world of matter exists altogether independently of the perceiving mind. Motion similarly is assumed by mechanical science to exist independently of the mind, in spite of the difficulties involved in the assumption.

So Physics assumes atoms, action at a distance, etc. Psychology as a natural science deals with things in the same partial and provisional way. These data are -- 1. Thoughts and feelings, or whatever other names transitory states of consciousness may be known by. Knowledge, by these states of consciousness, of other facts.

These things may be material objects and events, or other states of mind. The material objects may be either near or distant in time and space, and the states of mind may be those of other people, or of the thinker himself at some other time. How one thing can know another is the problem of what is called the Theory of Knowledge. The full truth about states of mind cannot be known until both Theory of Knowledge and Rational Psychology have said their say. Meanwhile an immense amount of provisional truth about them can be got together, which will work in with the larger truth and be interpreted by it when the proper time arrives.

On any ulterior theory of matter, mind, and knowledge, the facts and laws of Psychology thus understood will have their value. Obviously, some of the data provides practical purposes when it is unwaveringly presumed to be true. The epistemic dichotomy is also found within our natural tendencies to describe certain first-person and third-person accounts in ordinary language, but often the epistemic dichotomy leads some to seriously consider whether there are two types of fundamentally different stuff with which we are concerned, namely, mental stuff and physical things.

Within this book I treat the latter dichotomy concerning real distinction between the mental and the physical as a false dichotomy and misconception that is detrimental to cognitive science. Such a dichotomy as the mental-physical one has led many scientists to search for a real distinction and demarcation line and objective boundary between the mental and the physical; the dichotomy often is presumed without doubt or suspicion.

Nevertheless, when it comes to some subjects and objects or physical entities there can be absolutely no real or actual distinction that can be made in a non-arbitrary way, and I suggest this is the case for all subjects and objects. For example, the subjects in an experiment who are accompanied by lights are only determined to be entirely or distinctly different things than the lights are from certain view points and levels of analysis e.

However, in fact, light consists of photons, and photons penetrate through our entire visual systems as well as the dorsal and ventral parts of our skulls, photons are absorbed by our brains, causing chemical reactions and color experiences, photons reflect and scatter away from our organisms, and biophotons6 are even emitted by each of the cells in our bodies. Man the object is separated by an impassable gulf from man the subject.

Distinguishing light from the human organism must involve some arbitrary distinctions that are made, which is comparable to the distinction between air, oxygenated blood and our lungs as we exhale, or a woman who is swimming in a lake, gulping mouthfuls of water, and urinating in contrast to or in a dichotomous opposition to the water itself i. Since the so-called subjects are made up of the very objects about which many thinkers attempt to distinguish them from i. Creativity can surely be mistaken for some passing social fad as well as the related mass cultural productions, which can substitute successful advertisement campaigns ideas about products for the quality of those products, such as pop art and much music sold via support of mass media systems.

How creative can a piece of music be, for instance, which is popular at present but will lose its appeal in five years, when the desire to hear it thereafter all but entirely fades away? What is the difference between imagery in a dream and during the waking state? Is daydreaming something that involves some of the same content concerning mental imagery that hallucinations do as well?

How dim or faint can mental imagery be before it has negative affects upon creativity? How vivid or intense is mental imagery that has negative affects upon creativity? What is the current theoretical understanding of mental imagery and its vividness formed within patients who are in minimally conscious states? How do creative geniuses, such as Nikola Tesla, compare to in respect to their abilities to form vivid and accurate mental imagery?

Creativity is an amazing mystery that has managed to baffle psychologists and philosophers for centuries. Mental images are those very same things about which Nikola Tesla writes in his autobiography, and which undoubtedly contributed to his efficiency in respect to his very creative and inventive mind. Imagery generally pertains to mental events that are visualizations of sights, sounds, smells, tastes and sensory feelings.

Creativity: From Potential to Realization

For example, if a person is asked if an apple is larger than a grape, then the individual may form mental images of both of these objects, compare them and provide inferences based upon the analyzed visualizations. Such mental imagery generally arises in such cases, even if one is asked not to visualize the apple or grape.

Our minds also utilize imagery throughout the creative process. The field of psychology as a science has only existed for a relatively short period of time in comparison to the other sciences because its origins trace back to around the time period of Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig in For example, in the first journal for psychological research was published and called Philosophische Studien i.

In the early 20th century John Watson, the founder of behaviorism, asserted that only publicly, as opposed to privately, observable phenomena are relevant to science. However, mental imagery is obviously not publicly observable and requires combinations of first- and third-person data in order for it to undergo intense scientific investigation. During the mid-twentieth century behaviorism, the scientific study of human behavior was the dominant approach disgust and happiness, for instance.

The study of microexpressions psychology may combine with mental imagery studies in order to shed light upon their interconnections and the role of imagery concerning emotions. Under the influences of John Locke and George Berkeley , David Hume , a Scottish empiricist, attempted to describe the functions and nature of the mind. The two perceptions of the mind include impressions and ideas. There have been very few experiments concerning mental imagery as it pertains to creativity. The purpose of the present investigation is to analyze experiments regarding both imagery and creativity in an attempt to illustrate the creative process as a whole with a special emphasis on mental imagery.

Mental Imagery and Creativity in Philosophy A. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The other species [is called]. Impressions [or Sensations] p. To Hume, nothing is present to the mind except for impressions and ideas. For example, eating an apple may involve seeing the redness, roundness and size of the apple, smelling it, and tasting its juice and the crispness of its skin.

A complex idea is two or more simple ideas in combination with one another. Or when a woman loves a man, a person fears a rabid dog or an individual hates a family member, these psychical events of the individual are also called impressions. We may divide these impressions into three groups: 1 We undergo impressions that are our sense perceptions, such as visual, auditory, olfaction, gustatory and tactile sensations.

The traditional notion of the latter five sense perceptions might, however, be best expanded so that we include the sense of balance in addition to other senses, for example. Interestingly, the latter type of impressions seem to first utilize the sense perceptions in order for emotions to present themselves and their vicissitudes.

PERSONALITY AND THE REALIZATION OF CREATIVE POTENTIAL.

So, for instance, love, fear and hate cannot take place without the use of sense perceptions and combinations of impressions. Importantly, the remembrance of 1 , 2 and 3 illustrates the elaborate varieties of ideas or mental imagery preceded by their corresponding impressions.

Hume referred to the second species of perceptions as thoughts or ideas. Ideas are the faintest images of the mind that are brought about by thinking, reasoning and reflection or when we think about seeing, hearing, smelling, loving, hating, willing or fearing. Ideas are the perceptions that enter the conscious mind in a manner that tends to be the dullest and least lively fashion. Additionally, the entrance of the ideas within the conscious experience occurs only after we have already undergone impressions, and these ideas tend to be fainter and duller perceptions of the mind than their comparatively similar and counterpart perceptions, which are the impressions.

Likewise, for any types of sounds the recall or recollection of the call is most typically not nearly as vivid as the call itself. However, we may also consider these ideas of redness, the scent of some flower and the notes of the whistle to be images in some senses that are representations. That is, they may repetitively present themselves, i. Although problematic, a tripartite theoretical framework arises, which can be presented as follows: subject-object-image. For instance, this is the case with light and color, which actually absorbs into the human visual system i.

So, it is problematic to maintain at what point the light is the object or image or even the subject since the brain itself as well as all living cells of plants and animals emit ultraweak biophotons, and light is made up of photons Rahnama et al. Likewise, it is debatable just how much the remembrances of the image of the object depend upon the object that exists independently and to what extent the remembrances of images affect the subjects observations and images of objects.

That is, many ideas may be considered to be impressions from which recollections of them follow, which are less vivid than the preceding perception. According to David Hume, there are two types of impressions, which include: I simple impressions; and II complex impressions. The simple ideas and impressions are distinguished by the vividness of their vicissitudes upon the mind. Thus, simple impressions are necessary conditions for simple ideas. However, not only are the sensations of vision and hearing completely absent from the deaf and blind individuals, but their ideas concerning these perceptions are at best rudimentary if not entirely nonexistent, i.

Perhaps the most obvious instances of deficits include those who are congenitally blind and who therefore can form no ideas about the colors. Even the language that is used with respect to colors is misguiding since reds and oranges may be described to blind people as warm whereas blues and violets are cold, despite the fact that blue flames burn at hotter temperatures than red, orange and yellow flames. For the latter sorts of reasons a person who has never seen something cannot form visualized mental images. A person who has never heard a note is unable to think about the sounds of music.

Moreover, the knowledge that these 11 Hume did concede that this natural fact about the human psyche is not provable; however, it has not been disproved. In order for this notion to be refuted one needs only to produce a simple idea that does not have a corresponding simple impression. William James upholds the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume in various respects within his psychology textbook. No mental copy, however, can arise in the mind, of any kind of sensation which has never been directly excited from without.

The blind may dream of sights, the deaf of sounds, for years after they have lost their vision or hearing; but the man born deaf can never be made to imagine what sound is like, nor can the man born blind ever have a mental vision. Fantasy, or Imagination, are the names given to the faculty of reproducing copies of originals once felt. When represented with surroundings concrete enough to constitute a date, these pictures, when they revive, form recollections.

When the mental pictures are of data freely combined, and reproducing no past combination exactly, we have acts of imagination properly so called. Some people undoubtedly have no visual images at all worthy of the name, and instead of seeing their breakfast-table, they tell you that they remember it or know what was on it. In fact, we may suspect them to be for most purposes better than terms with a richer imaginative coloring. The scheme of relationship and the conclusion being the essential things in thinking, that kind of mind-stuff which is handiest will be the best for the purpose.

Now words, uttered or unexpressed, are the handiest mental elements we have. Not only are they very rapidly revivable, but they are revivable as actual sensations more easily than any other items of our experience. Galton found to be the case with members of the Royal Society. Arditi et al.

Complex impressions are bundles of simple impressions, like complex ideas are compilations of simple thoughts. Complex impressions and complex ideas include differences other than vividness and the addition of memory. Typically there is a resemblance between complex impressions and ideas. It is not necessarily true that complex ideas are ever just fainter copies of the complex sensations they represent since the complex ideas may not very closely resemble the preceding complex impressions, i.

The comparison between complex impressions and complex ideas does concern the questionable accuracy of memory as well as the capability for the imagination to form accurately representative ideas of the environment in addition to creative ideas and their combinations. For instance, when a woman eats caviar, she experiences an assortment of sensations, such as tastes, smells and sights. She looks at the caviar and tastes and smells it. One may imagine the Amazon River with waterfalls of wine and beautiful Amazonian women bathing in nearby lagoons, but these complex ideas were not derived from the actual observance of this location and event.

The latter concerns the imagination in respect to complex ideas, but there are many examples of complex ideas that may more greatly rely upon the memory than the imagination. For instance, a person who has seen the city of London could not possibly, i. There is a compensation with respect to the accuracy of memory and the lack of imagination or vice versa, namely, the inaccuracy of memory and the presence of the creative imagination.

David Hume provides us with the example of the complex idea of God, which is a combination of the ideas of power, goodness and knowledge as well as infinity. Thus, the characteristics that are combined and multiplied by infinity reside entirely within the faculty of the imagination for Hume, which is an example of what Hume would consider to be a most extravagant set of mental imagery, if he had utilized such a phrase from contemporary cognitive psychology. That is, a simple idea and a simple impression cannot be subdivided into parts by the one who consciously experiences and remembers them, for example, because as soon as an idea or impression has parts it suffices to be complex.

The category of mental images, referred to as simple ideas, is only allowed to comprise our thoughts after our sense perceptions have afforded them to our minds, according to Hume. Thus, all ideas have preceding impressions. Interestingly, because Hume realized that not all ideas resemble impressions, he presents the distinction of the perceptions, dividing them into complex and simple perceptions i.

For example, walking through and experiencing an entire city involves complex impressions to arise, but thinking about the city later involves complex ideas that are not truly accurate copies of the incredibly complex impressions. Hume presumes that all simple impressions are represented and attended to by simple ideas that correspond to them. Both types of influences, namely, the influence of memory upon conscious experience concerning sensory perceptions and the influence of sensory perceptions upon the memory and imagination, i.

Hume maintains that if there is indeed a constant conjunction, then the relation between the perceptions is not due to chance or ontic coincidence 13 because a constant and continuous relation demonstrates what is best considered to be a form of dependency of, namely, either the impressions upon the ideas or the ideas upon impressions. Thus, cognitive research programs may consider that they are given the task of illustrating the conditions under which the constant and continuous relations of the influence of the memory i.

The very first appearance of simple impressions always takes precedence over and precedes the corresponding ideas. So, for Hume the foundational or primary aspect of the mind is the set of impressions, and there are basically three types of impressions that lead to the three following types of ideas: 13 An ontic coincidence is an uncaused event or completely unnecessary being that is not brought about by causes Hartmann, In addition to the three types of impressions it has been explained why any impression may be divided into the categories of simple and complex.

Moreover, such conscious experiences accompanied with unity also allow us to attribute several characteristics to the conscious experience in general as opposed to, for instance, the independent objects at which the conscious experience is directed. Our faculties of the imagination allow us to combine simple ideas with one another, according to Hume, which may well lead one to inquire how exactly the faculty of the imagination functions, especially with relation to memory.

Within the previous example the experience of redness must first be remembered in order to become an idea or thought. Our imaginations can form the complex idea of red vineyards within a small city via our faculties of the imagination, but it is necessary that we already first had the experience of redness before we could ever conjure up the totally imaginative image of the red vineyard, for instance.

Moreover, it is important to note that it is not always possible for our memories to be so incredibly accurate and that the latter inaccuracies may involve significant aspects of our creative imaginations. A red object Complex Impression shape and color Simple Idea of Color Figure 5 illustrates the two differences between a complex impression i. So, multiple ideas may be considered to be impressions i.

Consider Fig. Experience of the memory or idea Idea of the idea e. This means that certain ideas, such as roundness and being triangular, are not able to be conjoined in certain respects. For instance, there is no such thing and no such complex idea or complex impression that is a round triangle or a round pentagon. Moreover, the Humean cognitive psychologist considers the influence of memory, imagination and mental imagery upon the sensory and emotional impressions as well as those concerned with the conscious experience of decision-making.

Hume allows for higher order meta-cognitions and mental imagery that incorporates other mental imagery within it. The aspect of the theory to keep in mind concern the distinction between aspects of memory, imagination and impressions that are simple, i. Lastly, the cognitive process of the short-term and long-term memory that plays a role i. The Analogical Aspects of Perception: Pressing Tablets, Tracing Papers Simple thoughts are irreducible and indivisible ideas that are found to correspond and represent some impression that people have previously experienced in some sense.

Therefore, every simple idea is a copy or image of an impression, according to the latter conception. We may, therefore, compare the copy of an impression and an idea to a copy of a piece of paper out of a Xerox machine. However, one drawback of such an analogy is that such an image does not generally correspond to impressions that are not visual representations. For instance, smells and sounds i. A slightly better way of explaining the difference between the impression and idea is considering that that the mind is in some ways analogous to a blank clay tablet, an instrument for pressing and tracing, and sheets of paper.

At this point, the faculty of the imagination, i. So, the analogy proceeds as follows: Something excites the instrument to press against the clay in order for it to press an image on the clay tablet, which becomes an indentation i. The latter process repeats itself with a different excitation that brings about a different impression and a different image that is copied from the clay tablet, but the latter process occurs after the tablet has smoothed out perhaps most of the elements of the previous impression.

Lastly, the copied images from the traces are gathered or recollected and combined in various ways. The various ways that the copied images are combined that are both new and unique are also creative in virtue of being atypical, for instance. The traces are not always perfect because there are greater details within the impressions of the clay tablet than the tracing instrument can copy.

Perhaps some of the copies are sometimes even partially left upon the clay tablet, which hinders the tracing instrument from making totally accurate copies of a new impression because either the impression is affected by the tracing paper left upon it, or the tracing paper, which already has traces from previous impressions, is unable to form clearly accurate copies since the copies must incorporate the previously traced marks. The latter aspect of the analogy takes into consideration the Humean concept that the ideas may influence the impressions, or mental imagery may influence coming sensory perceptions, for instance.

Likewise, the mind proceeds as follows: Something excites the sensory organs, which allow the mind to form impressions that are able to be remembered and copied in the form of fainter ideas or thoughts. The latter process is repeated several times with different excitations, different sensory organs and different impressions upon the sensory organs, which result from the different excitations, and then these ideas are recollected or remembered together in multifarious ways.

When the recollected ideas are combined in both new and unique ways, the mind has developed something creative in virtue of its status of being atypical, for instance. In both cases of the mind and tablet-instrument-paper analogy the performance of creative acts concerns impression, fainter copies of impressions and then creative expression, which may best be described as that which one performs in unique ways and causes further impressions to arise, say, in oneself or others.

Perhaps both the Xerox and tablet analogies capture something that is true in virtue of the minds of the blind, deaf etc. The principle here holds that copies of copies tend to be less accurate and fainter but may still be capable of involving creative expression. Shortcoming of the Image and Tablet Analogy: Example of Uncreatively Imagining People and Racism Obviously, the aforementioned analogies have their drawbacks, but they at least have their place in teaching and stimulating exploration on the themes. So, the abstract idea of the triangle as well as many other concepts we have e.

No abstract idea can be illustrated, however, and the abstract idea of mental imagery is no exception, but the same is the case for the abstract idea of the biological cell due to its range of varying and incompatible characteristics. The main difference appears to be that the particular cell can be illustrated in a way where observers can agree upon the characteristics portrayed, whereas we are, at best, merely approaching the ability to portray mental imagery via observation, measurements and mutual agreements, which will involve neural correlates, first-person accounts and other sets of information Horikawa et al.

There may very well be some interesting implications concerning abstract ideas for cognitive science, mental imagery formation and creativity. For instance, perhaps the lack of creativity concerning the formations of mental imagery may involve cognitions that are racist. I am now considering a mental image, which involves an abstract idea, that a close friend of mine, Prof. Paul Hart Texas State University , asked hundreds of students to imagine. Most of the students were asked during an introductory level course to US history from the reconstruction period of the Civil War until present.

Hart, in essence, asked hundreds of students to form mental images of a single person from Iraq, and he proposed that they form this imagery shortly after September 11, and around the time period of the US invasion of Iraq in Of course, the abstract idea of an Iraqi involves women and children too! Iraqi women and children make up a majority of the Iraqi population.

In terms of the lack of creativity concerning mental imagery and its association with racism my suggestion is that a greater variety of mental images being formed would involve a type of social creativity. So, populations or social groups that are able to have such a diverse set of mental imagery that represents each portion of the demographics i.

The formation of mental imagery in such cases appears to be involved in racism, which is a typical tendency to homogenously form uncreative mental images about other races, societies, cultures, nations etc. Additionally, if the latter case is true, then it may suffice for individuals to form mental imagery of common images in order to determine the extent of the affects of mass media propaganda. Additionally, creatively is involved in the inventiveness of weaponry that is associated with destruction and destroying what was created and creative; the lack of creativity is found in the unquestioning individuals who unimaginatively think of the same type of person, for instance, which creates social contradictions at certain points when the individuals realize just how similarly they think in accordance with their own social groups that formed misrepresentations of much of the world and others.

A general principle of abstract ideas, people and creativity may thus be expressed as follows: The abstract idea of people includes all sorts of people of different colors, genders, ages, opinions, cultures etc. Moreover, sometimes individuals tend to form mental imagery with very similar content e. Transitions from Ideas to Different Ideas: Vivacity and Imagery The faculty of the imagination is guided by certain universal principles, and the faculty of the imagination is responsible for the various different separations of simple ideas as well as the unification of these ideas in various ways, according to Hume.


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The principles are applied by Hume to complex ideas that arise from other complex ideas within the subject rather than complex ideas that develop after one has undergone impressions or has heard the testimony or first-person account of another individual and thus transits from one idea to the next. That is, the first idea that comes to mind may be the effect, and the cause may thus arise thereafter. However, what Hume does not analyze at length is the transition of one simple idea to the next simple idea, despite the fact that one may think of a certain shade of blue and then think of the next contiguous shade of blue that is in close proximity to it in virtue of color space, lightness, darkness, hue et cetera.

If we imagine an apple and divide the colors, shapes or angles, smell, taste and texture into irreducible and indivisible parts, we have the divided the idea of the apple into a bundle of simple ideas. Furthermore, we find that it is not within our power to imagine a simple idea that does not correspond with some impression that we have previously experienced. Thus, it is impossible to think of something in certain ways when we have not in some way sensed it already.

For these reasons we allow children to experience the colors and sounds when we introduce the sensations to them rather than attempt to have them conjure up the idea of them in their heads, which often does not appear to be feasible. However, it is worthwhile to consider the fact that although it is impossible i. Thus, it is important to note that the vividness of the perception and perhaps even the accuracy of the perception in certain respects are less important in respect to the expression of creativity than the combination of other factors.

Extreme examples of this might well be considered in order to shed some light on what is meant here. However, despite the fact that such individuals can imagine certain scenarios, which allow brain activity in different regions to be measured, and such measurements of the activity allow scientists to give patients the opportunity to answer YES when they imagine playing a sport and NO when they imagine their home, there has been absolutely no description of the expression of creativity of these people. The reasons for the lack of the performance of creative endeavors is quite obvious, although the people are arguably able to form mental images with some degrees of vividness.

Figure 7 illustrates the brain regions that activate and that are measured when the imagination of playing a sport utilized for the purpose of answering YES to a question and imagination of being at home is utilized for the purpose of answering YES to a query Monti et al. On the other hand, the impression is a first-person experience rather than a third-person experience, such as the creative performance or expression. Although creativity undoubtedly requires some sufficient amounts of inner and vivid first-person conscious experiences and the internal workings of the mind allowing ideas to be tailored uniquely and finely, the expression of creativity is quite different than any portion of the creative process, including the formation of more vivid mental imagery.

Nikola Tesla, for instance, has been accredited with the ability to form incredibly vivid mental images, which were so elaborate that he even claimed that he would be able to tell whether prototypes of machines should be developed based upon whether they would function properly first from within his vivid and accurate visual mental images. That is, Tesla was able to visualize vast amounts of working parts of mechanical machines in order to predict with remarkable accuracy what their functions would produce once they were constructed. I mean here that his invention of alternating current induction motor, which is found in most motorized household appliances, and the alternating current generators, which revolutionized the basis for power within all industrialized nations infrastructures.

They were pictures of th hings and scenes which I had really see en, never of those imagined. When a word was spoken to me, the image of the object itt designated would present itself vividly to my vision and sometimes I was quite unable to distinguish whether what I saw was tangible or not. This caused me great discomfort and anxiety. None of the students of psychology or physiology, whom I have cons sulted, could ese phenomenon. The theory I have formulated is that the images were the result of a reflex action from the brain on the retina under great excitation.

They certainly were not hallucinations such as are produced in diseased and anguished minds, for in other respects I was normal and composed. To give an idea of my distress, suppose that I had witnessed a funeral or some such nerve-wracking spectacle. Then, inevitably, in the stillness of night, a vivid picture of the scene would thrust itself before my eyes and persist despite all my efforts to banish it.

If my explanation is correct, it should be possible to project on a screen the image of any object one conceives and make it visible. The incessant mental exertion developed my powers of observation and enabled me to discover a truth of great importance. I had noted that the appearance of images was always preceded by actual vision of scenes under peculiar and generally very exceptional conditions, and I was impelled on each occasion to locate the original impulse.

After a while this effort grew to be almost automatic and I gained great facility in connecting cause and effect. Soon I became aware, to my surprise, that every thought I conceived was suggested by an external impression. Not only this but all my actions were prompted in a similar way. The practical result of this was the art of teleautomatics which has been so far carried out only in an imperfect manner.

Its latent possibilities will, however be eventually shown. I have been years planning self-controlled automata and believe that mechanisms can be produced which will act as if possessed of reason, to a limited degree, and will create a revolution in many commercial and industrial departments.


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I was about twelve years of age when I first succeeded in banishing an image from my vision by willful effort, but I never had any control over the flashes of light to which I have referred. They were, perhaps, my strangest and [most] inexplicable experience. They usually occurred when I found myself in a dangerous or distressing situations or when I was greatly exhilarated. In some instances I have seen all the air around me filled with tongues of living flame. Their intensity, instead of diminishing, increased with time and seemingly attained a maximum when I was about twenty-five years old.

For instance, Oertel et al. Reliability of a short test of imagery. Perceptual and Motor Skills 25, These results suggest that vividness of mental imagery may be a trait marker across the schizophrenia spectrum. Complex ideas are divisible and separable, like the idea of the apple from the previous example. Previously it was mentioned that all ideas are first derived from our sensory perceptions, and the mind can imagine golden mountains with purple caps, for instance, and horses with horns and wings, which we have never seen.

However, these complex ideas are reducible to a number of simple ideas, previously derived from sensations, according to Hume. Thus, the relations of ideas are considered knowledge, and these ideas are things that can only be thought of as they are rather than in other ways. Our knowledge consists of the relations of ideas, which involves what is necessarily implied by our ideas. Thus, impressions are different from thoughts because they are more vivid, intense or lively than the latter.

Impressions enter the mind with the most force and violence, and are the first perceptions to appear. However, ideas conscious to our minds only after impressions have first presented themselves to our psyches, and complex ideas are less vivid and lively than sensations. This is the primary difference between thinking and feeling, to Hume. Thus, in sleep, in fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions.

However, the atheist might view justice as a term that implies one should be forgiven for his or her wrongdoings because the act that this person brought about has already happened and there is nothing that any one can do to prevent the consequences of that action. But the vast majority of the time thinking and feeling are very different. One interesting and seemingly paradoxical similarity between sensations and ideas, or feeling both emotionally and tactilely and thinking, is that ideas are sometimes impressions.

On the other hand, thinking is an impression as soon as one contemplates the act of thinking See Fig. However, sensations such as vision, hearing, tasting, touching, loving and 16 It may be argued that no one can draw a nonambiguous line between a sensation and an idea, but this in no way entails that a line cannot be drawn.

A nonambiguous line cannot be drawn between people who are tall and short, but obviously we can determine whether or not a person is tall or another individual is short, for instance. So, objectivity, as opposed to subjectivity, has nothing to do with whether or not a nonambiguous line can be drawn. They simply are impressions, and they are in no way mere reflections of sensations. For instance, if a person is thinking about thinking about fear, the thought about fear is an idea because it is a reflection of the sensation of fear. However, the thought about fear is also considered an impression when the thought itself is reflected.

Any sort of simple impression that exists on a spectrum, like the color spectrum, or experiences that can be more or less intense, such as tastes like saltiness, are impressions that we may form simple ideas of without the preceding impressions, according to Hume. The connection here is simply the transition between one thought to another however obscure and disconnected these ideas may appear concerning one another. For instance, when mankind observes a drawing or photograph we think of the actual art piece as the original object that it is depicting.

In a painting in Fig. The artist wanted to convey the idea that the object is not a pipe but a painting. For instance, a child may imagine a goat after he or she observes a dog because in many ways the dog resembles goats, which are also vertebrates, mammals, furry etc. The second transitional principle, according to Hume, is referred to as contiguity. When a person is thinking about one particular room in a house, for example, his thoughts may lead him to contemplate the status of the other rooms; and Hume refers to this connective principle as contiguity of location.

Whenever one has thoughts about the Great Depression in the United States during the s, for instance, this may lead a person to brood over the Presidency of Herbert C. One may even possess thoughts over the return of the U. Here, the idea of contiguity is that whenever humans have a thought and another idea follows that concerns a close location or contiguous time, the procession of thought is said to have a contiguous connection.

So, if you stand outside a pool hall and peer through the window as well as see me release the cue ball from my hand, then, even without seeing it hit the floor or hearing it, you may imagine that it loudly strikes the floor. The connection that the mind employs in regard to cause and effect events is vast. In fact, all cause and effect events could be the contrary because we can imagine them as such.

The connective occurrences of events are drawn together via the ability of the mind to model the world more or less accurately, which instantly transposes our thoughts toward possible causes. Thus, our minds have the ability to look at an event or setting and instantly derive an explanation or explanations for the event or setting, which take the form of a cause or effect.

So, in order for one to come up with a creative thought he or she needs only to take an idea, and transpose his or her thoughts via the three transition principles: 1 resemblance; 2 contiguity in location and time; and 3 cause and effect. These three manners by which we connect ideas become more flexible with learning and experiencing in general because experiencing allows individuals to gain access to the ideas that are necessary for creative phenomena.

Creativity is a matter of being able to connect ideas to one another in new and innovative ways. C is accomplished via the three transition principles of the mind, which give rise to complex ideas that are sometimes innovative and pragmatic while others are old and useless, for instance.

Creativity for Everybody

Therefore, sensations, ideas and the transition principles are all necessary conditions for the ability of the human psyche to create. This type of creation involves thought rather than accidental discoveries found through manipulating external objects. Experiencing as much as possible and having more different experiences than others may allow for more ideas to arise than others would possess. However, without time to reflect upon these experiences the individual may not be able to utilize the ideas in order to be creative.

Studying, for instance, would allow one to attain more ideas via combining remembrances of past sensations and augmenting them in order for them to resemble what is being studied. Greater amounts of ideas that an individual possesses bring about a greater potential for that individual to have readily available ideas for the imagination and memory.

The latter transition principle, which we may consider to be a hypothesis about mental imagery, also concerns cause and effect because causation involves events that are close with respect to time and space. Titchener, an Englishman who studied psychology under the guidance of Wilhelm Wundt. Movement is the ultimate fact of physical science. The measurement of the direction and velocity of movements is the most satisfactory achievement of science, and the scientist is contented with his explanation of any natural phenomenon when he has reduced it to movements and expressed their relations in a mathematical formula.

On the other hand, nothing could be less attractive to the scientific investigator with such an aim than the domain of mental imagery, the world of imaginary objects. Mental images are not only removed from general observation and open to direct study only by the individual who experiences them, but even he has no satisfactory way of measuring them and reducing them to mathematics.

Titchener had a major impact on American psychology. Titchener 20 Behaviorism appeared to many to be a full-proof type of investigation of psychological phenomena because behaviorism seemed to merely focus upon behavior and the measurements of movements. Name of resource. Problem URL. Describe the connection issue. SearchWorks Catalog Stanford Libraries. Creativity : from potential to realization. Responsibility edited by Robert J. Sternberg, Elena L. Grigorenko, and Jerome L. Edition 1st ed. Physical description x, p. Online Available online. Full view. Green Library.

C Unknown. More options. Find it at other libraries via WorldCat Limited preview. Contributor Sternberg, Robert J. Grigorenko, Elena. Singer, Jerome L. Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Plucker and Ronald A. Summary Who is creative