In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity , Rorty extended this claim by abandoning all pretenses to an analytic style. Opting for a Proust-inspired narrative approach where arguments for universal rights, common humanity, and justice are replaced with references to pain and humiliation as motivation for society to form solidarities contingent groupings of like-minded individuals in opposition to suffering, Rorty substituted hope for knowledge as the main thrust of his efforts.
Tolerant conversations rather than philosophical debates and idiosyncratic re-creation rather than self-discovery have been hallmarks of his pragmatic pursuit for social hope, the pursuit of which can be characterized as a historicist quest for human happiness that abandons a search for universal truth and timeless goodness in favor of what works.
More recently, Rorty developed his notion of the uses of philosophy by using as his template a reading of Darwinian evolution applied to Deweyan democratic principles. Rorty died on June 8, As early as , Rorty had moved away from an initial interest in linguistic philosophy as a way of finding a neutral standpoint from which to establish a strict science of language, and he began his shift to pragmatism.
With the publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature , Rorty further elucidated his maturing anti-essentialist, historicist positions as applied to topics such as the philosophy of science and the mind-body problem, as well as the philosophy of language as it pertained to issues of truth and meaning. With Consequences of Pragmatism , Rorty developed in greater detail the themes covered in his work.
With Contingency, Irony and Solidarity , Rorty first implicitly linked his rejection of philosophical appeals to ahistorical universals with that of his pragmatist narrative, a narrative of free, idiosyncratic individuals who, inspired by intuitions and sensibilities captured in great works of literature, commit themselves to contingent solidarities devoted to social and political liberalism.
Furthermore, these individuals, detached from the need to justify their world-view by an appeal to the way the world is, would see moral obligation as a matter of social conditioning by cultural forces, which are in turn structured by the prevalent human needs and desires of a specific era. His Essays on Heidegger and Others is devoted to harmonizing the works of Heidegger and Derrida with the writings of Dewey and Davidson, particularly in their anti-representational insights and stances on contingent historicism.
Later writings, such as Truth and Progress ; A chieving our Country : Leftist Thoughts in Twentieth-Century America ; and Philosophy and Social Hope , clarify his anti-essentialist stance by integrating a neo-Darwinian perspective into a Dewey-inspired pragmatism. Although the writing of any philosopher will have countless influences, there are generally only a handful which stand out as major inspirations. Rorty is no exception.
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It was G. Thus, Rorty contends, Hegel helped us to begin to substitute pragmatic hope for apodictic knowledge. Of course, Hegel saw his own philosophical efforts as elucidating the progression by which the rational becomes real. That is, he conceived history as the process of the Absolute becoming increasingly self-manifest the Incarnate Logos through the development toward, and concrete realization in, the human consciousness. It is an evolutionary process, one that fully involves human beings; we are no exception. If language is at all a break in the continuity between other species and humans, it is only insofar as it is a tool that humans have at their disposal, which amoebas, squirrels, and the like do not.
Nevertheless, just as other species have developed the tools of night-hunting, migration and hibernation to adapt to environmental change, we have used language as a tool for our survival.
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As a conveyer of meaning, language should be understood as the use of sentences to achieve a practical goal through a cooperative effort. In this way, borrowing from Darwin, Rorty naturalizes language. So too can a hunt for a non-human purpose for human life. Without transcendent standards or intrinsic ends to aspire to, we humans find ourselves radically free to invent the purpose of human life and the means to achieve it. In fact Rorty suggests that the main, albeit unintended, contribution of Darwin is the de-mythologizing of the human self considered as part of an unnarrated, objective reality.
This is the pragmatic vocabulary that Rorty envisions Darwin preparing with his notion of evolutionary change, a vocabulary that is further molded by the writings of Martin Heidegger. Martin Heidegger influenced Rorty in the direction of process over permanence. Each thinker in his own fashion seeks a force that overwhelms the subject as it makes its project evident. By doing so, the individual ceases to create and live his own projects in deference to the presence of the stronger influence.
The submission to this influence would be both a concession to a power greater than oneself and identification with it. And it is in this identification, Heidegger claimed, that a subtle shift from an attitude of subservience to one of control and domination occurs within the seeker. Thus the unspoken goal of the metaphysically-inclined advocates of this philosophical tradition is to be free from the contingency, the uncertainty, and the fragility of the human condition by a release into and identification with the eternal. Valuing power above fragility, propositions over words, truth to metaphor, philosophy above poetry, in the hands of pre-Heideggerian philosophers the use of language becomes merely a means in the pursuit of a reality and a force which rises above the signifier.
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It is at its core inauthentic. The will to truth of the metaphysician is actually the poetic urge in disguise. Since antiquity, the ontotheological tradition is the attempt by poetic thinkers to deploy a series of metaphors to break away from the contingency of poetic metaphor.
Rorty understands Heidegger to be saying that there are just we humans and the power of the words we happen to speak. There is no designer, no controller, and no choreographer of human projects, only ourselves and the languages we create. And metaphor is what discloses Being, just as Being is formed and manifested in metaphor. With Heidegger, Rorty agrees that there is no hidden power called Being. Nor is there any non-linguistic, pre-cognitive access to an already present Being that underscores some narrative as preferred.
There is no way to escape the contingencies of language to get at Being-in-itself. We are all enmeshed in final vocabularies that present Being in diverse and incommensurate ways. No understanding of Being is better than any other understanding. Yet Rorty also insists that it is impossible to rank understandings because no descriptive account can better help us get behind that which is poetically construed. There is no validating reality behind our narrative; Being and interpretive narrative arise together. The fading conviction originating with Plato that language can adequately represent what there is in words opens the way for a pragmatic utilization of language as a means to address current needs through practical deliberations among thoughtful people.
This view of language is critical for Rorty. With the shift in attitude away from the expectation, on one hand, that through narrative a revelation of moral perfection may become manifest, or, on the other, that through the clear and methodical use of language epistemic certainty may be achieved, humanity is freed to view morality and science as being evolving processes, where means lead to ends and those ends in turn become means toward future aims.
In rejecting representationalism and the essentialism that it implies, Dewey abandons the Cartesian-inspired spectator account of knowledge, which radically separates the knowing subject from the object being studied. No longer considering that objectivity a result of a detachment from the material under study but rather as an ongoing interaction with that which is at hand, Dewey elevates practice over theory; better said, he puts theory in service to practice.
His failure to reject the alleged epistemologically privileged stance is one main reason Rorty must re-imagine Dewey. Instead, memes compete with one another in an evolutionary struggle over cultural space, just as genes compete for survival in the natural environment. They establish their niche in the socio-ecological system. Thus the driving force in human existence becomes the socio-linguistic.
All options are competing goods. But he believes that the benefits for a democratic society where there is an unfettered competition of ideas outweigh the downside of his anti-universalist stance. Rorty wishes to promote consciously a democracy of plurality and hope rather than one where either private autonomy or communal solidarity dominates. This sentiment can be found most clearly beginning with Contingency, Irony and Solidarity , culminating in Philosophy and Social Hope Growth, or the flourishing of ideas in a political environment that is conducive to the flowering of ideas and practices, is the hope for the future.
While there is no metaphysical grounding of this hope in the essence of humanity or in the structure of the world, Rorty maintains that a future where we may continue to be astounded by the latest creative endeavors is a future where human happiness has the best chance. As such it stood in the way of growth and constructive change. By shifting attention away from traditional memes to those that focuses on the future, Dewey meant to reconstruct philosophy into the exercise of practical judgment, a dedication to the kinds of understanding that are geared to contemporary obstacles that obstruct the flow of expressive creativity.
With the assent of practice, the distinctions characteristic of dualism, those between mind and matter, thought and action, and appearance and reality, blur and fall away. Following precisely on this notion is political egalitarianism. If there is not to be dualistic distinction in the abstract, then none should be manifested in practice. Rorty accepts that individual self-reliance ought to be exercised on a communal level. Dewey promotes philosophy as the art of the politically useful. His is a social democracy where the policies that bring social utility are the policies that are best.
This is where pragmatism fuses with utilitarian values. Rorty suggests that it is reasonable to offer persuasive rhetoric rather than the use of physical assault or its preludes of mockery and insult, because coming to terms with people will likely increase human happiness in the long run. That is, by keeping open the lines of communication, new and exciting projects for the betterment of our condition has the best chance to develop than if fear and intimidation are the norm. It is the establishment of conditions conducive for human happiness that is the utopian hope within the human heart.
This follows easily from his Deweyan take on Darwinism. Different disciplines are founded to achieve different purposes.
Richard Rorty (1931—2007)
Once we abandon the idea that one vocabulary is best suited to express the intrinsic order of things, then the ability to express the truth through the use of one vocabulary but not another is due to the different focus of interest that each vocabulary has, and not because one excels beyond all others in the expression of facts. There is a flat, deontologized, playing field among different descriptive strategies. So, for instance, if psychology is rightly conceived as a different practice than, say, economics, it is a practice that is geared to achieve a particular outcome deemed as important by the discipline of psychology, but not necessarily to economics, or for that matter, physics, ethics, and so forth.
But no strategy can claim to have the unique language-strategy that gets things right. This distinction, common in all dualisms, is seen as necessary only when credence is given to there being disparate ontological realms—one containing beliefs, the other containing non-beliefs for example, matters of fact. Truth then becomes the correct analysis of the non-causal relation between particular beliefs and specific non-beliefs.
But Davidson argues that such a dichotomy lacks credibility. There is no need to establish a connection, it is the human condition. This carries over to our own individual webs of belief. For Davidson, truth is a transparent term that in itself does not explain anything but emerges when the rules for action causally interact successfully with the world. Rorty rejects all appeals to truth, Davidsonian or otherwise, in favor of social justification. Because there are no comprehensive barriers between oneself and the world, we are free to advance beliefs with the aim of persuading others as to their efficacy in obtaining the outcomes they most desire.
Recognizing the value of the Enlightenment challenge to religious speculation, and its offering of a humanist philosophy in its place, Rorty argues that the Enlightenment program was never completed. It fell short of its goal by keeping one foot in the past. Rorty holds that our relation with the environment is purely causal. However, the way in which we describe it—the linguistic tools we employ to cope with the recalcitrance of that environment in an effort to achieve our purposes and desires, as natural creatures in the natural world—determines how we understand that world.
Once we are causally prompted to form a belief, justification may take place in a social world where, as Davidson notes, only a belief can justify a belief.
In short, Rorty maintains that there can be no norms derived from the natural, but only from the social. This position allows Rorty to reject scientism the representationalist view that cleaves to the Myth of the Given while endorsing the development of a fully-naturalized science as an extremely useful tool for prediction and control. It also opens the way for Rorty to advance naturalized democracy with confidence. Instead of seeking some underlying fact about human nature which is essential, ahistorical, and universalizable, Rorty proposes we seek the justifications that are relevant to a contextually embedded practice.
The loss of the unconditionality associated with long-established notions of truth is actually a gain, pragmatically speaking. While truth is an aim that is unachievable due to its definitional ambivalence prior to commitment to action, justification is a recognizable and contingent goal that permits practical satisfaction without closing the door on future recalibrations in response to inevitable challenges to such justifications.
The best way to allow for justification of a belief with no neutral standpoint, Rorty suggests, is to allow competing beliefs to be evaluated on their performance capabilities and not on their ability to ground themselves in universal validity. The following are various positions Rorty takes in accordance with his project of New Pragmatism. One is always in touch with reality as a language user, thus the distinction between truth-conditions and assertibility-conditions dissolves.
However, it is important to note that although we humans use language to engage the environment it does not make the process artificial, in the sense of language concealing a transcendent reality behind social constructs, or by its being in wholesale error concerning the inherent character of the natural world. That is, they do not refer to Platonic Forms or Aristotelian essences, but to linguistically constructed, intentional objects.
Trump and his proposed wall. Is his analysis a bit oversimple? Even within universities, there have always been optimistic champions of America, those who ever-passionately believe in the moral arc bending toward justice and work ever-diligently on formulating concrete, actionable policies that would make the country more just. By focusing only on his own environment, academia, Mr. During the s, the academic left may have started to turn its back on poverty, but actual politicians on the left were still thinking a great deal about it: Robert F.
Kennedy was visiting poor white families in Appalachia; Lyndon B. Johnson was building the Great Society. Rorty decries. Obama genuinely did something for the immiserated underclass, and both men, in their ways, rejected identity politics. Remember Mr. Clinton dressing down Sister Souljah? Or Mr. Clinton was particularly guilty of this charge, passing Nafta, appointing Robert Rubin as his Treasury secretary and enthusiastically embracing financial deregulation.
Obama pushed the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And he was one of those fancy elites. Which brings us to Hillary Clinton. Bernie Sanders did. And lost. She was in favor of the Partnership until she was against it. In he served as president of the prestigious Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association and was at the helm when a group of nonanalytic philosophers staged a protest at the annual meeting and, in a contested election, seized control of the presidency.
Rorty had the authority to rule the election null and void on the grounds that some nonvoting members had cast ballots but chose to let the results stand. That same year he published Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, which took the academic world by storm. In his earlier analytic work Rorty might have been seen as a philosopher of mind.
Intuitions, immediate representations of objects, are passively received from the world and must be synthesized—subsumed under general concepts—in order to contribute to knowledge. Judgments that result are true—that is, represent the world objectively—if this act of synthesis has been carried out correctly, and philosophy has as one of its major aims to understand what this entails.
Descartes, for example, trying to secure the indubitability of knowledge in an age of skepticism, conceived of mind as ontologically distinct from matter, and Kant retained this conception, seeking to explicate the relationship between mind and world. Rorty, however, depicted these notions as essentially mythological—guesses about mind that developed in a historical context where knowledge of the actual workings of the human brain was limited. Key to this program, in its various forms, was the assumption that a distinction could be drawn between cognitive material supplied by the senses and that supplied by the mind itself, with the latter securing the indubitability of the former.
But it was precisely the sharpness of this distinction that was under attack in contemporary philosophy. He went on to argue that there was a convergence between this conclusion and the insights of Donald Davidson and Thomas Kuhn. In this capacity philosophers would be doing what many writers, poets, artists and other cultural creators also do, but would come at it with a different vocabulary and set of sensibilities and talents. Rorty did not see himself as the first philosopher to advance such an argument. It was not in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature but in the essays republished in Consequences of Pragmatism that Rorty fully identified his intellectual project with pragmatism.
What unifies these essays is the project of tracing a dividing line in modern philosophy. Such a scientistic orientation, Rorty argued, was currently dominant in U. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity , he argued that pragmatic ironism could be reconciled with the demands of liberalism. In Achieving Our Country , he took the position that there was no better way for the American left to renew itself than by embracing the Deweyan pragmatism that had been central to early twentieth-century American progressivism.
And in Philosophy and Social Hope , he outlined a pragmatist perspective on morality, law, education, and religion.